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The negative economic impact on women and children of separation and divorce 
has been well documented.  The effect is often driven by women tending to have 
a weaker attachment to the labour force and therefore lower independent 
income. Traditionally, couples often ‘specialise’ with one spouse (usually the 
husband) focussing their time and energy in the labour market and the other 
(usually the wife) tending to have a lower attachment to the labour force by 
either working part-time or not at all and taking on a higher share of unpaid 
domestic and caring responsibilities. This is particularly the case for couples with 
children - of the total number of couples of working age with children 41% have a 
sole male earner while 20% are dual earners with the male working full-time and 
female working part-time2.This situation requires a long term financial 
commitment between spouses over time. This arrangement may be weakened if 
the risk of marital breakdown increases. Women may decide to increase their 
participation in the paid labour market in response to an increased risk of marital 
breakdown in order to ensure access to independent income if the marriage were 
to end. In light of this, we examine the impact of divorce legalisation on the 
labour supply of women in Ireland.  
 
Ireland was one of the last European countries to legalise divorce. This occurred 
in 1996 after a narrow win (a 50.28% majority) for the Yes campaign in the 
November 1995 referendum. The left hand side panel of Figure 1 illustrates the 
rise in marriage breakdown in Ireland between 1985 and 2007. We can see a 
clear upward trend in marital breakdown numbers. The dotted line indicates the 
year when divorce was legalised, 1996. It is not possible to say if the rise in 
marital breakdown numbers is due to divorce legalisation. It can be argued, 
however, particularly in light of the debates surrounding divorce around the time 
of the referendum (with the No campaign suggesting that divorce legalisation 
would open the ‘floodgates’ to marital breakdown) that, at the very least, the 
perceived risk of marital breakdown increased once divorce was legalised.  
  
1  This article presents a summary of: Bargain, O., Gonzalez, L., Keane, C. And Ozcan, B. “Female Labour Supply and 
Divorce – New Evidence from Ireland” European Economic Review, Vol. 56, Issue 8, November 2012, pp.1675-1691 
2  Own calculations using the CSO’s Survey of Income and Living Conditions, 2010. 
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It is necessary to find groups of women with a low and high risk of marital 
breakdown and compare the trends in their labour supply in order to establish 
whether divorce legalisation actually caused a labour supply response. This is 
particularly necessary as the time period examined (1994 to 2001) was a time of 
increasing female labour force participation overall. If the assumption that 
divorce legalisation increased the risk of marital breakdown holds then we would 
expect to see larger increases in labour supply amongst women with a higher 
marital breakdown likelihood. We do this by comparing the trend in labour supply 
of ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ women. As divorce is banned by the Catholic 
Church, it is plausible to think that religious women would be less likely to 
separate/divorce and therefore be less responsive to divorce legalisation. The 
right hand side panel of Figure 1 supports this notion. It shows the rate of marital 
breakdown of ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ women between 1994 and 2001. 
Using data from the Living in Ireland Survey, ‘religious’ women are categorised as 
those who attend church at least once a week. ‘Non-religious’ women are those 
who attend less than once a week or never do. Firstly, we see that religious 
women have a much lower rate of marital breakdown (less than 3%). Secondly, 
we see that this rate remained flat between 1994 and 2001, suggesting that the 
legalisation of divorce had no impact on the marital breakdown probability of 
these women. On the other hand, non-religious women had a sharp increase in 
their rate of marital breakdown (rising from 8% in 1994 to 12% in 2001).  
 
Comparing the trends in female labour supply and participation rates of religious 
and non-religious women we find that both groups of women had a similar trend 
in participation prior to 1996 but that after this point the participation rates of 
non-religious women increased more sharply. This is in line with the theory that 
an increased (perceived) risk of marital breakdown (associated with divorce 
legalisation) led to an increase in female labour supply. The results hold once we 
control for other factors that may differ between religious and non-religious 
women such as age and educational attainment, as well as number and ages of 
children. We find that women with a higher risk of marital breakdown (non-
religious women) increased their participation rates by around 5 percentage 
points more than women at a lower risk (religious women). The effect is driven, 
not by an increase in hours worked by women already in employment, but rather 
an increase in participation in the labour market for women who were not 
previously working. This finding suggests that having some attachment to the 
labour market, rather than increasing hours worked, is important as a form of 
‘self insurance’ in the case of marital breakdown and suggests that the 1996 
divorce legalisation has a role to play in explaining at least part of the rise in 
female participation that occurred over recent decades in Ireland.  
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FIGURE 1 Trend in Marital Breakdown 
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